Montana’s Long Arm Statute Construed: Product Liability (Bullard v. Rhodes Pharnacal Co., Inc., 263 F. Supp. 79, D. Mont. 1967) by Cromley, Brent Reed
Montana Law Review
Volume 28
Issue 2 Spring 1967 Article 9
1-1-1967
Montana’s Long Arm Statute Construed: Product
Liability (Bullard v. Rhodes Pharnacal Co., Inc., 263
F. Supp. 79, D. Mont. 1967)
Brent Reed Cromley
University of Montana School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Legal Shorts is brought to you for free and open access by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Montana
Law Review by an authorized editor of The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law.
Recommended Citation
Brent Reed Cromley, Montana’s Long Arm Statute Construed: Product Liability (Bullard v. Rhodes Pharnacal Co., Inc., 263 F. Supp. 79, D.
Mont. 1967), 28 Mont. L. Rev. (1966).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol28/iss2/9
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
influenced by the nature of the crimes, available prison facilities, rehabili-
tation opportunities, parole practices, and other related factors. In a state
that has indeterminate sentencing and rehabilitation programs, the length
of time the criminal actually spends in prison can vary according to his
rehabilitation. In Montana, however, the emphasis is placed on punish-
ment rather than rehabilitation, and a person convicted of burglary and
larceny could receive a definite sentence of up to 29 years.5 1 This is
nearly twice the sentence he could receive if he committed only one of
the crimes, and must be considered in view of the fact that his object was
the commission of only a single wrong. Since each crime by itself carries
the possibility of a stiff sentence, a rule allowing the offender to be
sentenced for only one of them would give the judge enough latitude to
impose an adequate sentence according to the facts of the case, and would
still be in accord with the "humane policy of our law."
JOSEPH T. SWINDLEHURST
MXIONTANA'S "LONG ARM" STATUTE CONSTRUED: PRODUCT LIABILITY.-
Plaintiff sued an Ohio corporation whose principal place of business
was Chicago. She alleged injury to her respiratory system caused by
perfume manufactured by the defendant in Chicago. Defendant's only
contact with Montana was the shipment of products to Montana whole-
sale and retail outlets, constituting less than one-half of one per cent of
its total business. feld, the defendant had sufficient "minimum contacts"
with Montana so that personal service of process upon it did not offend
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' Sales and a gen-
eral intention to sell products in Montana subjects a foreign corporation
to the jurisdiction of Montana courts. Bullard v. Rhodes Pharmacal Co.,
Inc., 263 F.Supp. 79 (D.Mont. 1967).
In 1877, Justice Field, in Pennoyer v. Neff,2 defined the extent of a
state court's jurisdiction:
The several States are of equal dignity and authority, and the inde-
pendence of one implies the exclusion of power from all others. And
so it is laid down by jurists, as an elementary principle, that the laws
of one State have no operation outside of its territory, except so far
as is allowed by comity; and that no tribunal established by it can
extend its process beyond that territory so as to subject either per-
sons or property to its decisions. 3
R.C.M. 1947, § 94-2706 provides a punishment of not less than one nor more than
fourteen years for grand larceny. R.C.M. 1947, § 94-903 provides a punishment of
not less than one nor more than fifteen years for first degree burglary, and not more
than five years for second degree burglary.
"I' [N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . . U. S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
95 U.S. 714 (1877).
1Id. at 722.
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As a result, a state could enforce the obligations of only those cor-
porations formed under its own laws.4 It was not until the mid-nine-
teenth century, when corporate transactions assumed a more national
character, that state courts recognized a basis for assuming jurisdiction
over foreign corporations. That basis was consent, and more important,
consent implied from the fact of a corporation doing business within the
forum state. 5
Because state law governs the permissible extent of a state court's
jurisdiction-limited only by due process--states enacted "doing busi-
ness" service of process statutes.7 States were then confronted with the
problem of determining what constituted "doing business."8
International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington9 caused the central
issue to shift from doing business to the broader concept of due process
as the basis for determining a state court's jurisdiction. In order for a
state to attain in personam jurisdiction over a defendant corporation it
was necessary that the corporation have "certain minimum contacts with
the forum state such that the maintenance of he suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and justice'."'1 Emphasis moved from
any fictional basis of "presence" in the forum state: "It is enough that
appellant has established such contacts with the state that the particular
form of substituted service adopted there give reasonable assurance that
the notice will be actual.""
Twelve years later, the Supreme Court in McGee v. International Life
Insurance Co.' 2 again demonstrated the "clearly discernible trend toward
expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign cor-
porations."' 3 Factors which the Court considered, in addition to the
"fundamental transformation of our nation's economy," were the actual
receipt of notice by defendant, the relative convenience of the available
'Id. at 735; Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25 (1877); Eagle Insurance Co. v.
Ohio, 153 U.S. 446 (1894).
'Article, Developments in the Law: State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909,
919-20 (1960); HENN, CORPORATIONS 106-07 (1961); JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 636
(1965).
'Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
'Developments in the Law, supra note 5, at 920, citing Maryland as the first state to
enact such a statute. Montana's original "doing business" statute was enacted in
1915. Laws of Montana 1915, eh. 22, § 1. Its history is discussed later in the article.
See text at notes 25 to 28, infra.
sSee, e.g., Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917) ; Hutchin-
son v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930); Graham and Ross Mercantile
Co. v. Sprout, Waldron & Co., 174 F.Supp. 551 (D.Mont. 1959); State ex rel. Ameri-
can Laundry Machinery Co. v. District Court, 98 Mont. 278, 41 P.2d 26 (1934).
-326 U.S. 310 (1945).
"Id. at 316.
"Id. at 320.
-355 U.S. 220 (1957).
11Id. at 222. The decision was a remarkable extension. Plaintiff was suing as bene-
ficiary of a life insurance contract in California. The defendant insurance company,
located in Texas, had never had representatives in California and apparently had no
other insurance contracts in that state.
1967]
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forums, and the state's interest in securing to its citizens a means of
redress for wrongs committed against its residents.1
4
One year after McGee, the Supreme Court indicated in Hanson v.
DencklaI5 that the trend toward expanding state jurisdiction was not with-
out limit. Chief Justice Warren, while recognizing that the rigid state-
border limitation of Pennoyer16 had been supplanted by the flexible rule
of McGee,'17 wrote:
The application of that rule [McGee] will vary with the quality and
nature of the defendant's activity, but it is essential in each case
that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws.' 8
The result of Hanson v. Denckla is that some voluntary act or activity
will be required to secure jurisdiction over foreign corporations.19
Since the International Shoe, McGee, and Hanson decisions, states
have enacted statutes which extend state court jurisdiction beyond the
traditional "doing business" tests.20 These "long arm" statutes commonly
base product liability jurisdiction over foreign corporations upon two
tests: regularly sending products into the forum state,2' and the com-
"Id. at 223-24.
--357 U.S. 235 (1958).
"Supra note 2.
'Supra note 12.
"
8Hanson v. Denckla, supra note 15, at 253. The fact situation was complex. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari in cases from both the Delaware and Florida
Supreme Courts. Residuary legatees had petitioned a Florida chancery court for a
declaratory judgment concerning property passing under the residuary clause of a
will. This property included trusts administered by Delaware firms. The Florida
Supreme Court upheld service of process on the Delaware trust companies as indis-
pensable parties. Meanwhile, the executrix under the will had instituted a declaratory
judgment action in Delaware, and the Delaware Supreme Court refused full faith
and credit to the Florida decree on the ground that the Florida courts had no
jurisdiction over the trust companies.
"Developments in the Law, supra note 5, at 934-35; Note, Due Process and Foreign
Corporations-The Minnesota Single Act Statute, 50 MINN. L. REv. 946, 962-64 (1966).
"OFor examples, see notes 21, 22 infra. Montana's statute is partially quoted in text
at note 32 infra. Cites to many of these "long arm" statutes are collected in
Revision Notes following WIs. STAT. ANN. § 262.05 (Supp. 1967); Briggs, Contem-
porary Problems in Conflict of Laws: Jurisdiction by Statute, (pt. I) 24 OHIO ST.
L.J. 223 (1963); (pt. II) 24 MONT. L. REv. 85 (1963); Currie, The Growth of the
Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 ILL.L.F. 533;
Comment, Jurisdiction Under "Long-Arm" Statute Over Breach of Warranty Actions,
22 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 152 (1965).
"For example, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-411(c) (1961 Rev.), provides:
Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this state, by a
resident of this state or by a person having a usual place of business in
this state, whether or not such foreign corporation is transacting or has
transacted business in this state and whether or not it is engaged
exclusively in interstate or foreign commerce, on any cause of action
arising as follows:
(3)" out of the production, manufacture or distribution of goods by such
corporation with the reasonable expectation that such goods are to be
used or consumed in this state and are so used or consumed, regardless
of how or where the goods were produced, manufactured, marketed or sold
or whether or not through the medium of independent contractors or
dealers; ....
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mission of a tort or tortious act within the forum state.22 However, there
is authority that the traditional "doing business" statutes might also be
exended as far; that is, to the limits of due process.
23
Montana's history of extending state jurisdiction to encompass for-
eign corporations has been chiefly statutory. Until 1951, Montana plain-
tiffs were limited to personal service only upon those corporations doing
business and having an agent, cashier or secretary within the state.
24
"Doing business" as a basis for personal service became an especially
harsh limitation when the Montana Supreme Court interpreted it as re-
quiring that degree of business which would require a foreign corpora-
tion to file a copy of their charter or articles of incorporation in Mon-
tana.25 In 1951, R. C. M. 1947, section 93-3008 was amended to permit
And in Florida:
(1) The acceptance by . . . all foreign corporations. . of the privilege
• . . to operate, conduct, engage in, or carry on a business or business
venture in the state . . . , shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment
by such persons or foreign corporations of the secretary of state of the
state as the agent of such persons or foreign corporations upon whom may
be served all lawful process in any action, suit or proceeding against them,
or either of them, arising out of any transaction or operation connected
with or incidental to such business ....
(2) Any person, firm or corporation which through brokers, jobbers,
wholesalers or distributors sells . . .by any means whatsoever, tangible or
intangible personal property, to any person, firm or corporation in this
state, shall be conclusively presumed to be operating, conducting,
engaging in or carrying on a business or business venture in this state.
FLA. STAT. § 47.16 (1965).
In several states regular sending of goods into the forum state is combined with
specific reference to tortious conduct. See, e.g., UNIFORM ACT in note 22, infra.
"For ekample, Illinois has what must be considered the "typical long arm statute:"
Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in
person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated,
thereby submits said person ... to the jurisdiction of the courts of this
State as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of said
acts:
"(b)" The commission of a tortious act within this State; . . . . ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1) (Supp. 1966).
In 1962, the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the
American Bar Association approved the Uniform Interstate and International Pro-
cedure Act which provides:
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts
directly or by an agent, as to a [cause of action] [claim for relief]
arising from the person's
(4) causing tortious injury in this state by an act or ommission outside
this state if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial benefit from goods
used or consumed or services rendered, in this state; . . . UNIFORM
INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT § 1.03(a).
To date, Arkansas and Oklahoma have adopted this act.
zNorthern Supply, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 397 P.2d 1013, 1016-17 (Alaska 1965);
Henry R. Jahn & Son, Inc. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.2d 855, 323 P.2d 437, 439
(1958).
"Laws of Montana 1939, ch. 186, § 1.
'State ex rel. American Laundry Machinery Co. v. District Court, supra note 8, at 29.
Justice Angstman dissented from equating these two uses of "doing business." One
year later, the Montana court seemed to retreat from this position, holding that the
same corporation, the American Laundry Machinery Co., was "doing business" in
Montana. State ex rel. Taylor Laundry Co. v. Second Judicial District Court, 102
Mont. 274, 57 P.2d 722 (1936). The court did not mention whether it still considered
the two uses of "doing business" to be equal.
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substituted service 26 upon a foreign corporation "actually doing business
within this state at the time the said action arose even though such cor-
poration has not filed a copy of its charter in the office of the secretary
of state of Montana and has not qualified to do business in this state."2
With the enactment of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure, ef-
fective January 1, 1962,28 Montana adopted its own "long arm" statute
which provided:
[A]ny person is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this
state as to any claim for relief arising from the doing personally,
through an employee, or through an agent, of any of the following
acts:
(a) the transaction of any business within this state;
(b) the commission of any act which results in accrual within this
state of a tort action;
(c) the ownership, use or possession of any property, or of any in-
terest therein, situated within this state;
(d) contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within
this state at the time of contracting;
(e) entering into a contract for services to be rendered or for ma-
terials to be furnished in this state by such person; or
(f) acting as director, manager, trustee, or other officer of any cor-
poration organized under the laws of, or having its principal
place of business within this state, or as executor or adminis-
trator of any estate within this state.2 9
Conceivably, jurisdiction over a foreign corporation which has mar-
keted a defective product in Montana could result from clauses (a), (b)
or (e). But a Montana court might be tempted to construe clause (a)
only as far as this state's former doing business statute, discussed above.
And clause (e) would require contract privity, limiting the effect of the
long arm statute.30  Clause (b) is more clearly applicable, and was the
foundation in the instant case for subjecting Rhodes Pharmacal Co. to
the jurisdiction of the Montana federal district court.3 1
"This method permitted substituted service upon the Secretary of State of Montana.
However, the precise method of service is not significant. Due process merely re-
quires that the substitute for personal service be reasonably certain of reaching the
defendant. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950);
Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962). In none of the cases con-
sidered herein is there an absence of actual knowledge of the pending proceedings.
'Laws of Montana 1961, ch. 13, § 4. But Montana courts appeared cautious in extend-
ing their jurisdiction. A Montana federal district court noted that although the
permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations had been expanded,
"this does not necessarily mean that the enlarged authority will be exercised."
Graham and Ross Mercantile Co. v. Sprout, Waldron & Co., supra note 8, at 556.
Moreover, in Clapper Motor Co. v. Robinson Motor Co., 119 F.Supp. 79 (D.Mont.
1954), the court quashed service of process upon an Ohio corporate defendant with
contacts similar to those of Rhodes Pharmacal Co. in the instant case. In Clapper,
the Ohio defendant had made sales through distributors located in Montana. This
defendant had even closer contacts with Montana than Rhodes Pharmacal Co. because
the Ohio corporation had also sent representatives to Montana to check on sales and
business methods. Yet the Clapper court held that the Ohio corporation was not
"doing business" in Montana, and therefore not subject to Montana jurisdiction.
"Laws of Montana 1961, ch. 13, § 4.
"MONT. R. Civ. P., Rule 4B(1).
'Because of the nature of modern production and business, the retail consumer is
seldom in contract privity with the manufacturer of any product.
"Bullard v. Rhodes Pharmacal Co., Inc., 263 F.Supp. 79, 81 (D.Mont. 1967). Although
sounding in tort, it may be helpful to note that a suit based on "product liability"
[Vol. 28
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A review of long arm statutes throughout the states shows the word-
ing of clause (b) to be unique. Apparently modeled after the compar-
able Illinois statute,32 Montana's is among the broadest of all such pro-
visions. 33 Montana does not require that the person subjected to Montana
jurisdiction commit a tort or tortious act within this state, but only that
the person commit an act which causes a tort action to accrue within this
state. States with the former requirement, however, have generally con-
strued the provision so that injury within the forum state is sufficient to
satisfy the requirement.3 4 The apparent intent of recent long arm statutes
is to extend state jurisdiction to the limits of due process.35 Therefore,
despite the variation in wording, their effect in extending product lia-
bility jurisdiction over foreign corporation may be the same.
The instant case is the first to construe M11ontana's long arm tort
liability statute.36 Although the court declined to declare that the effect
of the statute is to extend personal jurisdiction to the limits of due
process, it did recognize that possibility.37 Consequently, the court had
little trouble deciding that the statute providing for jurisdiction in the
particular case, and primarily considered the question of whether ap-
plying the statute in the instant case would deny the defendant due
process.3 8
"Minimum contacts" is one test used by the court, with those con-
tacts being weighed against the "tradition notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice" as promulgated by International Shoe39 and McGee.4°
quite generally relates to and arises from a prior business transaction. So in that
respect, there is a natural interrelationship between clauses (a) and (b) for exercising
personal jurisdiction over the corporate defendant.
"Products liability" as a distinct area of law appears to be developing a special
set of norms. Thus, although one defective product may be the "act" required by a
"long arm" statute, the cases dealing with products liability are based upon a
continuity and regularity of distribution of goods. Questions are raised as to
whether the "long arm" statutes will be applied to other areas of tort liability.
For example, a negligently caused fire may spread across a state line; or a defama-
tory broadcast may cause tortious injury in a state other than that in which the
broadcast originated. These areas have not been as fully considered in relation to
expanded state jurisdiction as product liability.
Several "tests for due process" have been proposed. Some of these, including an
original one, are considered in Towe, Personal Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents and
Montana's New Rule 4B, 24 MONT. L. REV. 3 (1962).
"Supra note 22.
"See Briggs, supra note 20, 24 MONT. L. REV. at 86 and 88.
"See, e.g., McMahon v. Boeing Airplane Co., 199 F.Supp. 908 (N.D. Ill., E.D. 1961);
Hearne v. Dow-Badische Chemical Co., 224 F.Supp. 90 (S.D. Texas 1963); cases cited
in 3 FRUNER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTs LIABILITY § 45.02 n.17 (Supp. 1966).
uSee, e.g., Deveny v. Rheem Manufacturing Co., 319 F.2d 124, 128 (2d Cir. 1963)
Delray Beach Aviation Corp. v. Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 332 F.2d 135, 137-38 (5th Cir.
1964); Roland v. Modell's Shoppers World of Bergen County, Inc., 92 N.J. Super. 1,
222 A.2d 110, 113 (1966). This is also true of Montana's statute. See Commission
Note following MONT.R.CIv.P., Rule 48. And Montana's statute has been suggested
as being among the broadest of such "long arm" statutes. See Briggs, supra note 20,
24 MONT. L. REV. at 86.
"See text at note 29, supra.
37Supra note 31, at 81 n.2.
'-Supra note 31, at 82.
Supra note 9, at 316.
"°Supra note 12, at 222.
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The court also recognizes the "purposeful act" limitation of Hanson v.
Denckla.41 Observing that each case must be determined on its own facts,
the court pointed out that the amount of sales of the foreign corporation
within the state may not be as important a factor as the intent to include
Montana within its general sales market:
It is true that in terms of percentage of its total sales, defendant's
contacts with Montana were slight. It is however inferable that these
contacts were limited only by the lack of demand in Montana for
defendant's product. It is fairly inferable that defendant's inten-
tion to do business in Montana was a general intention, and that to
the extent there was a demand defendant intended to sell in Mon-
tana. Given this state of mind which defendant was free to alter,
had defendant felt that the products liability climate of the state or
its long arm statute would be burdensome on it, is it unfair to treat
as the required "minimum contacts" this intention plus the fact of
the sales? * * * Certainly a defendant should not be subjected to
the jurisdiction of a distant state by accident, but when from the
general pattern of its business it may be said that it contemplated a
general products distribution in a state it does not seem unfair to
require that it defend its products' liability cases arising in that
state.
4 2
In light of recent decisions, the instant case is not of major national
significance. When a manufacturer regularly sends its products directly
to wholesale or retail distributors within the forum state, as in the instant
case, there seems to be ample authority for sustaining jurisdiction.4 3
When the contact has been through an intermediary, such as an assembler
or distributor, located outside the forum state, courts have been more
reluctant to extend jurisdiction. 44 However, in Gray v. American Radiator
& Standard Corp.45 jurisdiction was sustained where a defendant corpora-
tion had no direct contacts with the forum state. An Illinois plaintiff was
injured by an exploding water heater. Personal service was obtained
upon an Ohio valve manufacturer although it had not directly shipped
products into the forum state. The court refuted arguments of no "mini-
mum contacts" by pointing out that "a given volume of business is [not]
the only way in which a nonresident can form the required connection
with this State. '46 Defendant's commercial transactions on the interstate
level gave rise to a "reasonable inference that its commercial trans-
actions, like those of other manufacturers, result in substantial use and
consumption in this state. '47 The corporation had therefore "undoubtedly
"Supra note 15, at 253.
'
2Bullard v. Rhodes Pharmacal Co., Inc., supra note 31, at 83.
'See, e.g., Chovan v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 217 F.Supp. 808 (E.D.Mich.,
S.D. 1963); Harford v. Smith, 257 F.Supp. 578 (N.D. W.Va. 1966). Contra, Pend-
zimas v Eastern Metal Products Corp., 218 F.Supp. 524 (D.Minn. 1961).
'4Cases denying jurisdiction include Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co., 89
F.Supp. 654 (D.Md. 1950); tIellriegel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 157 F.Supp. 718
(N.D.Jll. 1957); Roland v. Modell's Shoppers World of Bergen County, Inc., supra
note 35; Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes and Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d
443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965). See Currie, supra note 20, at 547.
4522 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). Accord, Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 258 Minn. 571, 104 N.W.2d 888 (1960); Hearne v. Dow-Badische Chemical
Co., supra note 24.
"Gray, supra note 45, at 764.
"Gray, supra note 45, at 776.
[Vol. 28
7
Cromley: Recent Decisions
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1966
RECENT DECISIONS
benefited, to a degree, from the protection which our law has given to
the marketing of hot water heaters containing its valves.
'48
Gray upheld service of process even though there was no evidence
that the defendant had more than the one valve marketed in the forum
state.49 Rather, the court looked to defendant's sales on the interstate
level. The instant case raises the question of whether Montana courts
may look to it as authority for sustaining jurisdiction upon a foreign cor-
poration which has indirectly introduced only a single product into this
state.
The Montana statute refers only to the "commission of any act,"50
and does not suggest the need for continuity of sales within this state.
Nor is the language of the instant case 5 ' necessarily inconsistent with sus-
taining jurisdiction when there has not been continuity of sales within
Montana, but only sales on the interstate level. The court reasons that
"to the extent there was a demand defendant intended to sell in Mon-
tana." 52 Cases which the court cites support the more liberal extension of
jurisdiction. McGee5 3 ruled that a single business transaction is sufficient
to exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporate defendant.
McMahon v. Boeing Airplane Co. 54 upheld personal service on a non-resi-
dent corporation although the product, a commercial passenger airplane,
had been manufactured, tested, designed, sold and delivered outside the
forum state. Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club55 upheld service over an
Indiana motorized golf cart manufacturer which had not sold carts
inside Illinois, the forum state. Nor was there evidence of other such
golf carts having reached the forum state. The Keckler court stated the
rule:
Where a defendant does business of such volume, or with such a
pattern of product distribution, that he should reasonably anticipate
this his product may be ultimately used in any state, he has done the
act required for the exercise of jurisdiction by the state where the
injured used provides.56
The instant case recognized that this broader State jurisdiction
should not be extended so far as to encompass defendant corporation
which do not market on the interstate level. For example, a Montana
resident vacationing in California might buy a product from a local
manufacturer or dealer. If the product caused injury and damages once
the Montana resident returned home, it is unlikely that due process
48Ibid.
"Gray, supra note 45, at 76.
"Statute quoted in text at note 29 supra.
51Language quoted in text at note 42 supra.
"Bullard v. Rhodes Pharmacal Co., Inc., supra note 31, at 83.
'Supra note 12. Cited in the instant case supra note 31 at nn. 4, 6, 7.
"199 F.Supp. 908 (N.D.Ill. 1961). Cited in the instant case supra note 31 at nn. 5, 12.
"248 F.Supp. 645 (N.D.I11. 1965). Cited in the instant case supra note 31 at n. 12.
"Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club, supra note 55, at 648.
1967]
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would allow the dealer to be sued in the Montana courts, even though
the sale technically resulted "in accrual within this state of a tort
action.'5 7
It is submitted that the instant case, being the single construction
of the Montana long arm tort liability statute, is in accord with nation-
wide authority and sets a favorable precedent for Montana courts. Re-
stricting jurisdiction to the physical boundaries of the state, while mod-
ern corporations distribute their products nationally, hampers an injured
plaintiff in obtaining redress. Typically, the relevant evidence and wit-
nesses will be located in the state in which the injury occurs. Requiring
plaintiffs initially to assume the costs of maintaining a suit in a foreign
jurisdiction may preclude them from enforcing small claims. The profit-
able right which corporations enjoy by interstate distribution of their
products should give rise to a corresponding duty to defend suits involving
those products wherever they are circulated in the ordinary course of
business. Therefore, Montana courts should not limit themselves to juris-
diction over those foreign corporations evincing a specific intent to dis-
tribute products in Montana. Rather, the general intent to conduct busi-
ness on the interstate level, from which introduction of products into
Montana can be foreseen, should be the criterion. The instant case should
be recognized as authority for extending jurisdiction on the basis of
such a general intent.
BRENT REED CROMLEY
BARTER-EQUATION METHOD USED TO VALUE BLOCK OF LISTED STOCK.-In
1957 taxpayer shipping line sold ships to Moore-MeCormack Lines, Inc.
for $17,000,000. The latter issued 300,000 shares of its stock to taxpayer
as part payment of the purchase price.' The sales contract assigned a
value of $30 to the shares, although they were then selling on the New
York Stock Exchange for about $23.2 Taxpayer reported a capital gain
"7This is a variation of the hypothetical advanced in Erlanger Mills v. Cohoes Fibre
Mills, 239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1956), and commented upon in the instant case,
supra note 31, at 83 n.11. Such an example demonstrates the need for the rule that
each case must be decided upon its own set of facts. Bullard, supra note 31, at 82.
There are numerous variables to consider, including the extent to which the defendant
must be dealing in interstate sales, whether the plaintiff must be a resident of the
forum state (not expressly required by the Montana statute quoted in text at note
29 supra. But cf., Connecticut's statute, supra note 21), and whether the tort must
have a relation to the type of commercial activity in which the defendant is engaged.
'The remainder of the purchase price was to be paid in cash ($3,200,000) and promis-
sory notes or cash ($4,800,000), at Moore-McCormack's option. The promissory notes
actually given by Moore-McCormack were stipulated to have a fair market value equal
to their face value.
' The highest price at which Moore-McCormack stock had ever been traded on the New
York Stock Exchange was 251/4 during January and February of 1957. The price
had been as low as 17 in December of 1957, and 10% in 1960.
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